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Abstract
This report explores the Russian public demand for internet freedom. Produced by Erik Nisbet with the
Center for Global Communication Studies and the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, the study seeks
to uncover attitudes and opinions about internet regulation, censorship of online content, and the potential
for citizen mobilization and protest.
Key findings from the report include:
• Almost half (49%) of all Russians believe that information on the Internet needs to be censored;
• A plurality (42%) of Russians believe foreign countries are using the Internet against Russia and its
interests. About one-quarter of Russians think the Internet threatens political stability (24%);
• About four out of five Russians (81%) stated a negative feeling toward calls to protest against the
government and change political leadership;
• The Russian government and the Russian security service were virtually tied in the percentage of
Russians (42% and 41% respectively) that cited these organizations as trusted regulators of the
Internet;
• 51% of Russian believe the primary motivation of government legislation creating a blacklist of
websites is the maintenance of political stability versus 13% who believe the primarily motivation was
limiting democratic freedoms;
• 39% of Russian believe personal blogs should be regulated the same as mass media websites.
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What is the role of public opinion in the making of Inter-
net policy?  This seemingly simple question undergirds 
an important strand of research at our Internet Policy 
Observatory (IPO), part of the University of Pennsylva-
nia’s Annenberg School for Communication.
It is useful to determine, for example, the relationship 
of public opinion to “multistakeholderism,” the reigning 
model for the shaping of Internet policy. Those commit-
ted to multistakeholderism believe that the “public” is 
represented through the interacting complex that en-
compasses government, business, and civil society. 
“Public opinion” has a different vector. It can be seen 
as the amalgamated desire of designated publics, vari-
ously constituted. At the same time it is “sui generis” 
and therefore public opinion, in this sense, surmounts 
stakeholder status.  It is, at least in its ideal form, the 
thing it represents itself to be.  And achieving an un-
derstanding of the public and defining public opinion 
is central as it is the public whose legitimating arc is 
frequently invoked. 
In illiberal democracies, and semi-authoritarian states, 
as well, public opinion can operate as an element of 
“voice” in the sense implied by Albert O. Hirschman in 
Exit, Voice and Loyalty.  Notice of public opinion can 
serve as an early warning system of disapproval or 
dissatisfaction with official policies.   As a form of in-
telligence, it can indicate to national leaders whether 
their actions are deepening loyalty or quickening the 
impulse for radical change.  Government and officials 
shape, invoke, and follow public opinion. These fac-
tors—definitional, contextual, institutional—suggest 
the significance of continuing and intense attention to 
public opinion as a key variable in the global effort to 
resolve questions of Internet governance.   
As an important participant in international organs of 
Internet governance, without question, Russia is an im-
portant theater for pursuing these inquiries about public 
opinion’s role in the making of Internet policy. Russia’s 
internal regime is evolving, and evolving dramatically. 
The Russian government has turned to Internet poli-
cy as a means to sustain this evolution and “sell” its 
autocratic model of governance to the Russian pub-
lic while dampening internal and external sources of 
dissent. The Russian regime has become an initiator 
of new tools and mechanisms of control, sometimes 
harsh and repressive. Thus, Russia provides a useful 
policy model for semi-authoritarian states attempting to 
restrict Internet freedoms throughout Central Asia and 
beyond. Accordingly, we have turned to Russia as lo-
cus for testing methodologies, drafting questions and 
drawing forth implications on the role of public opinion 
in Internet governance. 
What does public opinion tell us?  The report—repro-
duced below—is illuminating.  From the perspective of 
assessing the public’s demand for Internet freedom, the 
results are somewhat discouraging. For example, only 
a complete ban of the Internet, a la North Korea, seems 
to be a motivating factor for Russians to mobilize in de-
fense of Internet freedom - otherwise most other forms 
of government censorship do not motivate the citizenry 
in any actionable way. Pluralities, if not majorities, of 
Russians believe the Russian government should cen-
sor online foreign media news and websites - and that 
foreign countries are using the Internet against Russia. 
 
Some key data points from the executive summary that 
show the lack of support for Internet freedom in Rus-
sia - and the support for censoring especially foreign 
sources of information are:
1. Almost half (49%) of all Russians believe that infor-
mation on the Internet needs to be censored.
2. A plurality (42%) of Russians believe foreign coun-
tries are using the Internet against Russia and its 
interests.  About one-quarter of Russians think the 
Internet threatens political stability (24%).
3. Large percentages of Russians do not like having 
information critical of the government or calling for 
political change being available online.  About four 
out of five Russians (81%) stated a negative feeling 
toward calls to protest against the government and 
changes to political leadership.  Likewise, a similar 
percentage of Russians (79%) feel negatively to-
ward websites and social networking groups that 
are used to organize rallies and demonstrations 
against the government. Nearly three-quarters 
(73%) of Russians also disapprove of negative 
Foreword
By Monroe Price
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information about public officials being available 
online.
4. Pluralities of Russians believe a social network 
group that is used to organize anti-government 
protests (46%), the video by Pussy Riot (45%), the 
website for the group that exposed the government 
blacklist of websites (44%), and bloggers that call 
for regime change (43%) should be censored by 
the Russian government.
5. The Russian government and the Russian secu-
rity service were virtually tied in the percentage 
of Russians (42% and 41% respectively) that 
cited these organizations as trusted regulators of 
the Internet, though more Russians ranked the 
Russian security service (17%) as their most trust-
ed regulator of the Internet as compared to the 
Russian government (13%).
6. About half of Russians (51%) believe the primary 
motivation of the government legislation creating 
a blacklist of websites is the maintenance of politi-
cal stability as compared to 13% of Russians who 
believe the primary motivation was limiting demo-
cratic freedoms.
7. The plurality of Russians (39%) believe personal 
blogs should be regulated the same as mass me-
dia websites. 
8. About one in five (18%) Russian Internet users 
replied that they had heard about a new legal re-
quirement that new websites should be registered 
with the Russian government agency that manag-
es online communications.  Out of these Internet 
users who had heard of the law, a rather large ma-
jority (70%) supported the law and a small minority 
(20%) opposed it.
One of the most significant questions raised by the 
study involves what assumptions to make about further 
and future impact of public opinion on Internet policy. 
Civil society groups and others often think of public 
opinion as a residual check on authoritarian behavior 
and as a reservoir of strength for the achievement of 
international norms.  But, as the study indicates, the 
opposite may be true.  Publics can lag on information 
and media rights.  And where both regime and public 
opinion are restrictive, positive change, especially by 
external actors, will be hard to achieve.
There are implications. One consequence of this line of 
analysis is to question the value of focusing so heavily 
on state institutions as the core area for thinking about 
harmful regulation. The way in which public opinion is 
shaped is significant here. The “public” is a collection of 
demographics ascertained, mulled over, and refigured 
by strategic players (governments, religions, NGOs 
and corporations) trying to mold these segments for 
their own benefit. How public opinion is retooled be-
comes a matter of competing strategic players affecting 
allegiances—a subject I explore in Free Expression, 
Globalism and the New Strategic Communication (re-
cently published by Cambridge University Press).
Gregory Asmolov gives examples of this contest to 
shape the public’s opinion: Public opinion concerning 
Internet regulation is partly (perhaps largely) a function 
of whether the communications environment is per-
ceived as dangerous—a place, in the rising Russian 
imagination, of suicide promotion, pornography and 
cultural and moral dissipation.  And, as Asmolov’s essay 
suggests, officials keen on regulation can be instru-
mental—together with allies in society—in fostering the 
sense of peril and fomenting insecurity. By so shaping 
the background, public opinion is channeled towards 
favoring repressive tendencies. There is a loop, then, 
between shaping and invoking public opinion.  The ex-
istence of this loop points toward the direction global 
public policy will likely take:  the need for greater atten-
tion to the significant public background views with all 
the complexity that it implies in a transnational context. 
This IPO study provides an important example of this 
feedback loop between the fixing of ideas of peril and 
the dynamic consequences for public opinion concern-
ing freedom of expression.
Our study implies an environment of interaction—where 
elements of civil society demand regulation, or are rel-
atively indifferent to regulation or where government 
prompts the conditions that provoke or spurs demand 
and the government responds. And there’s a related 
possibility: Professor Joseph Turow has suggested a 
“sociology of resignation,” where some version of “the 
public,” considering some outcome close to inevitable, 
acquiesces in a far less than optimal outcome. Turow’s 
context for the sociology of resignation was a tendency 
to accept privacy incursions, but the concept could be 
applicable to Internet content regulation. In this way, 
the public becomes habituated to an environment of 
control.
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Executive Summary of Survey Results
Profile of Russian Internet Users
The plurality of adult Russians may be categorized 
as “heavy Internet users” who use the Internet either 
every, or almost every, day (42% of the population). “In-
ternet non-users” who report not having been online in 
the last six months account for 38% of the population. 
“Light Internet users” who report using the Internet oc-
casionally to several times a week during the previous 
six months are 20% of the population. 
Adult heavy Internet users in Russia are young and well 
educated, with 59% between the ages 18 and 34yrs of 
age and nearly half (45%) having attended university. 
They are equally split between men and women. Adult 
Russians who do not use the Internet are predominate-
ly over 55 years of age (59%), female (59%), and a 
small minority has attended university (14%). 
Russian Internet users most commonly use the Inter-
net for to search for information for personal use (63%), 
communicate in online social networks (62%), and 
read national news (45%). The least frequent activi-
ties include searching for friends (15%), downloading/
purchasing software or apps (15%), managing online 
finances (12%), looking for employment (10%). 
Primary Sources of Information
Central Russian TV dominates as the number one 
source of information for 60% of all Russians and cited 
one of the three top sources of information for 84% of 
all Russians. Online news sites were as selected as 
the primary source of information for 10% and in the 
top three sources of information by 29% of Russians. 
Online social networks were selected as the primary 
source of information by 6% of Russians and in the top 
three sources of information by 25% of Russians. 
Central Russian TV (80%), online news sites (52%), 
and online social networks (46%) are three most com-
monly cited sources of information by heavy Internet 
users. Light internet users most commonly cite central 
TV (82%), regional TV (41%), and either central news-
papers (34%) or online news sites (35%) as within their 
top three sources of information. 
News on TV (90%), Russian news sources in general 
(87%), and newspapers (86%) are overwhelmingly 
trusted sources of information by Russians. In compari-
son, foreign media in general is trusted by 43% of the 
population, though Internet non-users (34%) are sig-
nificantly less likely to trust foreign media as compared 
to heavy Internet users (45%). 
Among Internet users, crowd-sourced resources such 
as Wikipedia are trusted the most (81%), followed 
closely by Internet publications (75%). Two-thirds 
(66%) of Internet users trust online social networks as 
sources of information and a bit over half (55%) trust 
online forums and blogs. Tips from friends are over-
whelmingly the most trusted (92% of Russians) offline 
source of information about businesses and products. 
Internet stores such as Amazon (67%) and online 
customer reviews (67%) are the most trusted online 
sources of commercial information by Russian Internet 
users.
Russian Attitudes about the Influence of 
the Internet and Dangerous Content
In total, about half of Russians (53%) believe the In-
ternet has a positive influence on society while about 
one-third (31%) of Russians believe it has a negative 
influence. This perception varies widely by frequency 
of Internet use with majorities of heavy Internet users 
(76%) and light Internet users (61%) believing it has a 
positive influence and a majority of non-users believe it 
has a negative influence (55%). 
A plurality (42%) of Russians believes foreign coun-
tries are using the Internet against Russia and its 
interests. One-third (33%) of Russians believe the In-
ternet substantially increases the rate of suicide. About 
one-quarter of Russians believe the Internet threatens 
family values (27%) and political stability (24%). The 
perception that the Internet threatens social ties in Rus-
sia is held by 21% of Russians. 
Large percentages of Russians have negative feelings 
toward politically controversial content being available 
online. About four out of five Russians (81%) stated a 
negative feeling toward calls to protest against the gov-
ernment and change of political leadership. Likewise, 
a similar percentage of Russians (79%) feel negatively 
toward websites and social networking groups that are 
used to organize rallies and demonstrations against the 
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government.  Nearly three-quarters (73%) of Russians 
also have negative feelings toward negative informa-
tion about public officials being available online. 
Russian Attitudes about Internet 
 Censorship
Almost half (49%) of all Russians believe that infor-
mation on the Internet needs to be censored. This 
percentage varies substantially by frequency of Internet 
use, with 57% of non-users believing online information 
needs to be censored compared to 43% of heavy Inter-
net users who feel the same.
Copyrighted material (59%), foreign news media 
websites (45%), other foreign websites (38%), and 
materials promoting ethnic/racial hatred (37%) are the 
most frequently mentioned categories of online con-
tent that Russians feel the government should censor. 
Preferences did not vary significantly by frequency of 
Internet use. 
A majority of Russians (59%) believe online porno-
graphic homosexual content should be censored by 
the Russian government. Pluralities of Russians be-
lieve a social network group that is used to organize 
anti-government protests (46%), the video by Pussy 
Riot (45%), the website for the group that exposed the 
government blacklist of websites (44%), and bloggers 
that call for regime change (43%) should be censored 
by the Russian government. 
Russian Attitudes about Internet 
 Regulation
The Russian government and the Russian security ser-
vice were virtually tied in the percentage of Russians 
(42% and 41% respectively) that cited these organiza-
tions as trusted regulators of the Internet, though more 
Russians ranked the Russian security service (17%) as 
their most trusted regulator of the Internet as compared 
to the Russian government (13%). 
Non-users of the Internet as compared to heavy Internet 
users are substantially more likely to cite government 
institutions or agencies as their trusted regulators of 
the Internet such as the Russian government (46% vs. 
36%), Russian security service (44% vs. 37%), and the 
Russian presidency (37% vs. 25%) as compared to 
heavy Internet users.
In contrast, heavy Internet users, as compared to non-
users, are substantially more likely to trust regulators of 
the Internet without official ties to the Russian govern-
ment such as private industry (32% vs. 18%), NGOs 
and other civil society groups (27% vs. 14%), and inter-
national organizations without ties to Russian officials 
(12% to 5%). 
A little over one-third of Russians (35%) had never 
heard or was unaware of the Russian legislation cre-
ating a blacklist of websites censored by the Russian 
government, though this percentage varied substan-
tially by frequency of Internet use. Almost half (49%) 
of non-users had never heard of the law as compared 
to about one-third (34%) of light users and about one-
quarter (23%) of heavy users.
About half of Russians (51%) believe the primary moti-
vation of the government legislation creating a blacklist 
of websites is the maintenance of political stability as 
compared to 13% of Russians who believe the primary 
motivation was limiting democratic freedoms. Heavy 
Internet users were more than twice as likely as non-
users (18% vs. 8%) to believe the primary motivation 
of the blacklist law was to limit democratic freedoms.
A majority of Russians (56%) believe the state is 
obliged to consider the public’s opinion and see pub-
lic advice on Internet regulation. About one-third of 
Russians (36%) believe the state can consider public 
opinion if it so wishes but in the end may act accord-
ing to its own preferences and 9% of Russians believe 
the state should not pay any attention to public opinion 
when regulating the Internet. 
The plurality of Russians (39%) believe personal blogs 
should be regulated the same as mass media web-
sites, 15% of Russians believe personal blogs should 
be regulated less than mass media websites, and 13% 
believe they should be regulated more, and 14% be-
lieve they should not be regulated at all. However, a 
very large percentage of survey respondents had diffi-
culty answering the question, with nearly one out of five 
(19%) replying that it was too difficult to tell.
Russian Citizen Mobilization and Protest
Russian Internet users (62% of survey respondents) 
were asked a series of questions about citizen mobili-
zation and protest in furtherance of Internet freedom. A 
majority of Russian Internet users (59%) do not  believe 
Page 9
FEBRUARY 2015                                                             BENCHMARKING PUBLIC DEMAND: RUSSIA’S APPETITE FOR INTERNET CONTROL
the regulation the Internet affects their personal free-
dom while 41% believe that they are impacted by 
regulation. 
A small percentage of Internet users (14%) believe pro-
tests against Internet censorship occurring in their local 
community are possible and about one in ten Internet 
users (9%) said they would take part in such protests if 
they occurred or approximately 6% of the total Russian 
population. 
The top reason for mobilizing in defense of Internet 
freedom cited by Internet users was a complete ban 
on the use of the Internet (40%). A complete ban on 
the Internet in the workplace was a distant second with 
11% of Internet users citing this reason. Other forms of 
Internet censorship such as government being allowed 
to remove any form of content (7%), ban of personal 
blogs or websites of opinion, cultural, or opposition 
leaders (7%), and temporarily shutting off the Internet 
due to protests (7%) were cited by a very small minority 
of Internet users. 
About one in five (18%) Russian Internet users replied 
that they had heard about a new legal requirement that 
new websites should be registered with the Russian 
government agency that manages online communica-
tions. Out of these Internet users who had heard of the 
law, a rather large majority (70%) supported the law 
and a small minority (20%) opposed it. 
Russian Internet users were asked under what circum-
stance they would or would not support the Russian 
government temporarily shutting down the entire Inter-
net within Russia.  Overall, 58% of Internet users would 
be in support of such a shutdown, with the case of a 
national emergency garnering the most support (48%) 
followed by 9% of Internet users believing a temporary 
shutdown would be justified in the case of a mass pro-
test and 1% citing another reason.  In contrast, 42% of 
Internet users believe the shutdown of the Internet by 
the Russian government would never be justified no 
matter the situation.
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The percentage of Russians using the Internet has 
more than doubled between 2009 and 2012 growing 
from 29% in 2009 to 64% in 20131. However, since 
2012 the growth of Russian Internet penetration has 
stagnated with no significant growth. Respondents to 
the survey may be split into three segments based 
on their frequency of Internet use (see Figure 1). The 
largest segment is “heavy Internet users” who use the 
Internet either every, or almost every, day (42% of the 
population). The second largest segment is “Internet 
non-users” who report not having been online in the 
last six months and accounts for 38% of the popula-
tion. The smallest segment is “light Internet users” who 
report using the Internet occasionally to several times a 
week during the previous six months (20% of the popu-
lation). 
As detailed in Table 1, Russians who have not accessed 
the Internet in the last six months are overwhelmingly 
55 years of age or over (59% of segment), are more 
likely to be women (59% of segment), and are very un-
likely to have attended any university education (14% 
of segment). In comparison, heavy Internet users are 
the mirror image of non-users in terms of age and edu-
1 International Telecommunication Union ICT Indicators 2014 
Database 
Profile of Russian Internet Users
FIGURE 1: RUSSIAN FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE (percentage of total respondents)
cation, with heavy Internet users likely to be thirty-four 
years of age or younger (59%) and almost half attend-
ing or completing university education (45%). Also in 
contrast to the other two segments, heavy Internet us-
ers are split evenly 50/50 between men and women. 
Light Internet users are more similar to heavy Internet 
users than non-users in terms of age and education, 
with 80% of light users under the age of fifty-five years 
and the plurality (40%) having attended or completed 
university. However, their gender split (42% male, 59% 
women) resembles non-users. 
Internet users were asked about the types of online 
activities they did during the last month. Table 2 lists 
those activities in which at least 10% of Internet us-
ers reported participating. Among all Internet users, the 
most popular activities were searching for information 
for personal use (63%), communicating in social net-
works (62%), and reading national news (45%). The 
least common activities were looking for a job (10%), 
online banking (12%), searching for people with simi-
lar interests (15%), and downloading software or apps 
(15%). The greatest differences in reported activities 
between heavy Internet users and light Internet users 
were downloading/ listening to music (45% vs. 23%), 
reading forums or blogs (31% vs. 11%), and corre-
sponding by e-mail (45% vs. 26%). 
Page 11
FEBRUARY 2015                                                             BENCHMARKING PUBLIC DEMAND: RUSSIA’S APPETITE FOR INTERNET CONTROL
TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents)
Frequency of Internet Use
Demographic Category Non-Users Light Users Heavy Users
Age
% 18-34 years old 6 34 59
 % 35-54 years old 35 45 32
% 55 or more years old 59 20 8
Gender
 % Men 42 42 50
% Women 59 59 50
Educational Attainment
% Vocational Secondary Education or Less 45 24 23
% Completed Vocational College 41 36 33
% Incomplete University or More 14 40 45
TABLE 2: ONLINE ACTIVITIES DURING LAST MONTH BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of Internet users, 
 mutiple responses) 
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Internet Activity % of Light 
Users
% of Heavy Users % of All Internet Users
Search for information for personal use 52 69 63
Communicate in social networks 54 66 62
Read national news 39 48 45
Correspond by e-mail 26 45 39
Download, listen to music 23 45 38
Download, view video 25 43 37
Read international news 24 35 31
Search for information for work 27 35 32
Read forums or blogs 11 31 25
Use Internet telephony (Skype, etc.) 15 27 23
Stream Internet TV 11 24 20
Play online games 13 22 19
Chat/forums/blogs 8 22 17
Online shopping 9 21 17
Read books 12 20 17
Download, purchase apps, software 9 18 15
To search for friends, people with similar interests 12 16 15
Manage bank account through the Internet 5 15 12
Look for a job, part time job, freelance 7 12 10
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Survey respondents were asked to rank their top 
three primary sources of information they relied upon 
the most. Sources which garnered at least 10% of re-
sponses are presented in Figure 2 with the percentage 
that selected each source as their primary, second-
ary, or tertiary source of information. Central TV is 
by far the most popular source of information among 
Russians, with 60% of Russians selecting this commu-
nication channel as their primary source of information, 
17% selecting as their secondary source, and 7% as 
their tertiary source – 84% of all respondents in total. 
Regional TV is the next most popular source of informa-
tion with 46% of Russians citing it was one of their top 
three sources of information and 31% citing it as their 
number one or two ranked source. Central newspapers 
are the third most cited source of information with 30% 
of Russians ranking them in their top three sources, 
though only 5% cite them as their primary source. 
In contrast, online news sites are the second most 
often cited primary news source next to Central TV, 
with 10% of Russians naming them as their primary 
source of information and 29% placing it within their 
top three sources overall. Online social networks round 
out the top five most popular source of information in 
Russia with 25% of all Russians citing them and 6% 
of Russians naming them as their primary source of 
information. 
Table 3 provides the percentage of Russians that 
named each source as one of their top three sourc-
es of information combined by Internet use segment. 
Though Russian central TV is the most cited source 
of information across all Internet use segments, non-
users were significantly more likely to cite central TV 
(88%) as compared to light (82%) and heavy (80%) 
Internet users. Regional Russian TV (54%) was by far 
Primary Sources of Offline and               
 Online Information
FIGURE 2: TOP THREE PRIMARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION  
(percentage of respondents who ranked each source, single reponse) 
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the second most mentioned source of information by 
Internet non-users followed by central newspapers as 
a distant third (36%). Regional Russian TV was also 
the second most cited source of information for light 
Internet users (41%) albeit at a significantly lower fre-
quency than non-users. 
However, in terms of their third overall most popular 
source of information, light users cited both central 
newspapers (34%) and online news sites (35%) in ap-
proximately equal amounts. Heavy Internet users cited 
regional Russian TV (32%) and central newspapers 
(22%) with much lower frequency in compared to the 
other two Internet use segments. Instead, heavy In-
ternet users were significantly more likely to mention 
online news sites (52%) and online social networks 
(46%). All in all, these survey results suggest the pos-
sibility that heavy Internet users may be more likely 
to rely on primary sources of information less directly 
controlled or influenced by the Russian government as 
compared to non-users and light users of the Internet. 
How much trust Russians place in different types of 
information sources was asked of survey respondents 
(see Tables 4 and 5). The types of information sources 
were split into two general categories, 1) general news 
and information and 2) information about products and 
businesses. Not surprisingly, non-users tend to trust 
offline sources more than light and heavy Internet 
users, except in the case of foreign media, whereas 
significantly higher percentages of light (42%) and 
heavy (45%) Internet users trusted foreign media as 
compared to non-users (34%). Otherwise, TV news, 
Russian news in general, and newspapers all enjoyed 
very high levels of trust across all three segments. 
There was very little difference between light and heavy 
users in terms of their trust in online sources of news 
and information. For both segments, online sources of 
information such as Wikipedia were trusted the most 
(85% and 83% of light and heavy users, respectively). 
The least trusted online source of general news and 
information were online forums and blogs for both light 
(53%) and heavy (58%) Internet users. 
Turning to commercial sources of information, offline 
sources such as tips from friends enjoyed a great deal 
of trust (90% or greater for all three segments) from 
all respondents, with mass mailings the least trusted 
(31-36%) across all three segments. The other notable 
variation was for TV advertisements which light (50%) 
and heavy (48%) Internet users were more likely to 
trust as compared to non-users of the Internet (41%). 
As an online source of commercial and product infor-
mation, 75% of heavy Internet users trust online stores 
and shops, their most trusted source of information, as 
compared to 61% of light Internet users. In contrast, 
the most trusted online source for light Internet us-
ers (67%) for commercial or product information were 
online customer reviews. Otherwise, light and heavy 
Internet users had similar patterns of trust, with least 
trusted online sources of information being dating 
websites (39% for light, 36% for heavy) and Internet 
advertisements (34% for light, 31% for heavy). 
TABLE 3: TOP 3 PRIMARY SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY INTERNET 
USE SEGMENTS
(percentage of total respondents, multipe responses) 
TABLE 3: TOP 3 PRIMARY SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents, 
 mutiple responses) 
Frequency of Internet Use
Top 3 Primary Source of Information % of Non-
Users
% of Light 
Users
% of Heavy Users % of All 
Respondents
Central TV 88 82 80 84
Regional TV 53 41 32 42
Central newspapers 36 34 22 30
Online news sites 0 35 52 29
Online social networks 0 29 46 26
Regional radio 30 23 18 24
Regional newspapers 34 20 10 21
Central radio 14 9 6 10
Blogs 0 4 7 4
Foreign mass media 0 2 5 2
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1. For non-Internet sources, percentage of all respondents reported, for Internet sources, % of only Internet users reported
2. n.a. = not applicable 
TABLE 4: TRUST IN SOURCES OF GENERAL NEWS AND INFORMATION BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of 
respondents who cited using source, single response)
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Source % of Non-Users % of Light Users % of Heavy Users % of All Respondents1
News on TV 94 91 87 90
Russian news sources in 
general
89 87 85 87
Newspapers 91 90 81 86
Foreign media in general 34 42 45 43
Internet Sources
Folk Encyclopedia on  Internet 
(e.g. Wikipedia)
n.a. 85 83 81
Internet Publications n.a. 76 78 75
Online social networks n.a. 69 67 66
Forums and Blogs n.a. 53 58 55
TABLE 5: TRUST IN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCTS AND BUSINESS BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS 
(percentage of respondents who cited using source, single response)
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Source % of Non-Users % of Light Users % of Heavy Users % of All Respondents1
Tips from friends 90 92 93 92
TV advertisements 41 50 48 46
Mass mailings 31 36 33 34
Internet Sources
Internet stores/shops (e.g. 
Amazon)
n.a. 61 75 67
Online Customer Reviews n.a. 67 68 67
Company or organizational 
websites
n.a. 63 62 63
Emails from companies and 
stores
n.a. 54 49 49
Dating websites n.a. 39 36 36
Internet advertisements n.a. 34 31 31
1. For non-Internet sources, percentage of all respondents reported, for Internet sources, % of only Internet users reported
2. n.a. = not applicable 
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Russian Attitudes About the Influence of the 
Internet and Dangerous Content
Survey respondents were queried on whether they 
perceived the Internet as having an overall positive in-
fluence on people’s lives, an overall negative influence, 
or no influence at all. In total, about half of Russians 
(53%) believe the Internet has a rather positive influ-
ence, about one-third (31%) believe it has a rather 
negative influence, and the remainder (16%) believe it 
does not have any influence on people’s lives. 
However, as illustrated in Figure 3, the perceived influ-
ence of the Internet varies significantly by frequency of 
Internet use. A majority (55%) of non-users perceive 
the Internet as having a negative influence on people’s 
lives as compared to about half as many light (23%), 
and even fewer heavy (15%), Internet users. Converse-
ly, three-fourths of heavy Internet users (76%) perceive 
the Internet as having a positive influence, followed by 
61% of light Internet users, only one in five (21%) non-
users. About one-quarter of non-users (24%) believe 
the Internet has no influence at all, a perception shared 
FIGURE 3: PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNET BY INTERNET USE 
 SEGMENTS (percentage of respondents who cited using source, single 
reponse)
by even fewer light (16%) and heavy (9%) Internet us-
ers. 
Beyond beliefs about the Internet’s overall positive or 
negative influence, Russians were also asked if the In-
ternet posed a threat across five different dimensions, 
namely a) threatening Russian political stability, b) sub-
stantially increasing the rate of suicides, c) threating 
family values, d) threatening the strength of social ties 
in Russia, and e) being used as a tool against Russia 
by foreign countries. Figure 4 provides the percentages 
of Russians that agreed, disagreed, or were indifferent 
to these perceived threats of the Internet. 
Half or more of Russians disagree that the Inter-
net threatens Russian political stability (50%), family 
values (53%), and the Russian social ties (56%). A 
plurality (42%) of Russians agrees that the Internet is 
being used by foreign countries against Russia. Rus-
sians are very split on whether the Internet increases 
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the rate of suicides, with one-third (33%) agreeing that 
it does, about one third indifferent (35%), and one-third 
(33%) disagreeing with the idea.
However, opinions about these possible threats from 
the Internet vary substantially across the three Internet 
use segments as exhibited in Table 6, with non-users 
substantially more likely to view the Internet as threat-
ening as compared to light and heavy Internet users. 
For instance, a plurality of Internet non-users (39%) 
agree that the Internet threatens family values whereas 
large majorities of light (62%) and heavy (70%) Internet 
users disagree. Also in contrast, one-third of non-users 
(33%) agree that the Internet threatens Russia’s po-
litical stability as compared to 22% of light and 19% of 
heavy Internet users who feel the same. 
The perception that the Internet is being used by foreign 
governments against Russia has a plurality of agree-
ment among Internet non-users (46%) but opinions are 
much more split among light and heavy Internet us-
ers. A plurality of light internet users (45%) also agrees 
that the Internet is being used against Russia by other 
countries but at the same time, 35% disagree. The 
idea that the Internet is being used against Russia by 
foreign countries finds the least support among heavy 
Internet users with the plurality (43%) of heavy users 
disagreeing with this perception and about one-third 
(36%) agreeing. 
In addition to perceptions of influence and threat, sur-
vey respondents were asked whether they personally 
felt positively or negatively about seventeen specific 
types of information being publicly available on the 
Internet (see Table 7). These types of information fell 
into four broad categories of content: 1) socially or cul-
turally offensive (i.e. pornographic, violent, obscene 
language), 2) recruiting information for fringe religious 
sects or extremist groups, 3) politically controversial or 
illegally downloadable content (i.e. protests, copyright-
ed material), and 4) information harmful to health and 
wellbeing (i.e. how to commit suicide, smoking promo-
tion). 
Across all seventeen types of Internet content, Rus-
sians felt most negatively about scenes of child abuse 
FIGURE 4: PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE INTERNET
(percentage of total respondents,  single reponse)
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TABLE 6: PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE INTERNET BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS 
(percentage of total respondents, single response)
Frequency of Internet Use
% of Non-Users % of Light Users % of Heavy Users
Type of Threat % Agree % Disagree % Agree % Disagree % Agree % Disagree
Internet threatens family 
values
39 29 27 62 18 70
Internet threatens demo-
graphic situation
29 34 18 67 16 71
Internet threatens political 
stability 
33 29 22 60 19 63
Internet is used by foreign 
countries against Russia
46 17 45 35 36 43
Internet substantially in-
creases the rate of suicide
37 20 34 36 28 42
TABLE 7:  FEELINGS TOWARD TYPES OF INTERNET CONTENT (percentage of total respondents, single response)
Valence of Feeling
Type of Internet Content % Positive % Indifferent % Negative
Socially or Culturally Offensive
Scenes of child abuse 1 3 96
Scenes showing the use of drugs 1 4 95
Scenes of aggression, violence, and cruelty to people 2 5 94
Content specific to sexual minorities, such as homosexuality 1 5 94
Violence and cruelty in online games 2 9 90
Pornographic materials 2 9 89
Texts/video/images with obscene language 4 15 82
Recruiting Information for Fringe Groups
Calls to join radical or extremist groups 1 6 94
Calls to join religious sects 1 8 91
Calls to join fraudulent business opportunities 2 16 83
Politically Controversial or Illegal
Calls to protest against governments and for change of the 
current political leadership
2 17 81
Websites and social networking groups that are used to 
 organize rallies and demonstrations against authorities
3 18 79
Negative information about public officials 5 22 73
Copyrighted video 9 21 70
Harmful to Health or Wellbeing
Information on how to commit suicide 1 5 93
Information about weapons, explosives, and their production 2 9 90
Promotion of smoking, alcohol 2 13 86
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TABLE 8:  NEGATIVE FEELINGS TOWARD TYPES OF INTERNET CONTENT BY INTERNET USE SEGMENT (percentage of 
total respondents, single response)
Frequence of Internet Use
Type of Internet Content % of Non-Users % of Light Users % of Heavy Users
Socially or Culturally Offensive
Scenes of child abuse 97 96 96
Scenes showing the use of drugs 97 97 93
Scenes of aggression, violence, and cruelty to people 96 95 92
Content specific to sexual minorities, such as homosexuality 96 94 91
Violence and cruelty in online games 95 93 84
Pornographic materials 95 88 85
Texts/video/images with obscene language 89 81 76
Recruiting Information for Fringe Groups
Calls to join radical or extremist groups 96 95 91
Calls to join religious sects 94 91 89
Calls to join fraudulent business opportunities 89 82 78
Politically Controversial or Illegal
Calls to protest against governments and for change of the 
current political leadership
86 80 77
Websites and social networking groups that are used to 
 organize rallies and demonstrations against authorities
89 75 72
Negative information about public officials 83 71 66
Copyrighted video 84 67 59
Harmful to Health or Wellbeing
Information on how to commit suicide 95 94 91
Information about weapons, explosives, and their production 95 91 85
Promotion of smoking, alcohol 90 87 81
(96%), scenes showing drugs (95%), scenes featuring 
aggression or violence toward people (94%), content 
specific to sexual minorities (94%), and calls to join 
radical or extremist organizations (94%). Content that 
is politically controversial or illegal was the least objec-
tionable, though a solid majority (70%) felt negatively 
about copyrighted video being publicly online and 73% 
feeling the same about negative information on pub-
lic officials. Even more Russians felt negatively toward 
websites/social networking groups that organize anti-
government protest activities (79%) and online content 
that calls for anti-government protests or changes in 
political leadership (81%). 
In terms of feelings toward different types of content, 
there was consensus across the three Internet use 
segments in reporting negative sentiment toward so-
cial or cultural content such as scenes showing child 
abuse, drug use, aggression, or homosexuality (see 
Table 8). However, significant differences in negative 
feelings among Russians based on their frequency of 
Internet use arose in the cases of violence in video 
games (95% of non-users vs. 84% of heavy Internet 
users), pornographic materials (95% of non-users vs. 
85% of heavy Internet users), and content featuring 
obscene language (89% of non-users vs. 76% heavy 
Internet users). 
The other types of content in which there was significant 
variation in negative feelings by frequency of Internet 
use (again see Table 8) were primarily political or legal. 
For example, 89% of non-users felt negatively about 
websites or social networking groups that are used to 
organize rallies and demonstrations against authori-
ties compared to 72% of heavy Internet users who felt 
the same. Likewise, 83% of non-users had negative 
feelings about negative information concerning pub-
lic officials being publicly online as compared to 66% 
of heavy Internet users who felt the same. The single 
largest difference in negativity among Internet use seg-
ments was in the case of copyrighted video material 
being publicly available online, with 84% of non-users 
feeling negative toward this content compared to only 
59% of heavy Internet users. 
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Russians were asked an overarching question about 
whether information on the Internet should be distrib-
uted freely without any censorship or whether some 
censorship by the government is necessary. Figure 5 
depicts their preference by frequency of Internet use 
segment. Overall, 11% of Russians believe the Internet 
should be completely free of government censorship, 
though there was substantial variation by frequency of 
Internet use. For example, 16% of heavy Internet us-
ers do not believe in any government censorship at all 
compared to just 5% of non-users. 
Almost half (49%) of all Russians believe that informa-
tion on the Internet needs to be censored, and again 
this percentage varied substantially by Internet use. 
Fifty-seven percent of Internet non-users believe infor-
mation online needs to be censored by the government 
as compared to a significantly lower 43% of heavy In-
ternet users. The percentage of Russians who believe 
government censorship depends on the type of content 
in question is at 40%, with no significant variation in 
percentages across the three Internet use segments. 
Russians were asked two sets of questions asking 
what types of online content specifically should be 
censored or blocked by the Russian government. The 
first asked Internet users to choose up to three types 
of Internet content that the Russian government should 
censor (see Figure 6). The top three most cited types 
of content were copyrighted material (59%), followed 
distantly by foreign news media websites (45%) and a 
virtual tie for third place between other foreign websites 
(38%) and materials promoting ethnic or racist hatred 
(37%). 
Russian Attitudes About Internet             
Censorship
FIGURE 5: OVERARCHING VIEW OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP BY 
 FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total 
 respondents,  single reponse)
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Differences in preferences for what types of 
content to censor varied very little by frequency 
of Internet use. The only noteworthy exception 
were Russian preferences for government cen-
sorship of other foreign websites where 39% of 
Internet non-users, 46% of light Internet users, 
and 34% of heavy Internet users chose this 
this type of content. This lower support among 
heavy Internet users for censoring other foreign 
media websites is consistent with their lower 
levels of belief that the Internet is being used 
against Russia by foreign countries and higher 
level of trust in foreign media as compared to 
Russians in the other two Internet use seg-
ments. 
The second question asked Russians if they 
agreed or disagreed with five specific types of 
Internet content being censored or blocked: 
1) the video by Pussy Riot, 2) a blogger that 
calls for regime change in Russia, (3) a social 
network group that is used for organization 
of protests against the government, 4) a por-
nographic website with homosexual content, 
5) the website for the group that exposed the 
blacklist of blocked websites (see Figure 7). 
Among Russians, there is large majority support 
for the government to block/censor a website 
with homosexual content (59%). Furthermore, 
this support is highest among heavy Internet 
users (62%), followed by non-users (59%) and 
light users (55%). A plurality of Russians agree 
that a social network group that is used for or-
ganizing anti-government protests (46%), the 
video by the anti-government female punk rock 
collective Pussy Riot (45%), the website that 
exposed the government’s blacklist of blocked 
websites (44%), and bloggers that call for re-
gime change (43%). 
There is little variation in agreement in censor-
ing these other specific types of online content 
by frequency of Internet use except in the case 
of the website that exposed the Russian gov-
ernment’s blacklist of blocked websites where 
heavy Internet users (48%) are significantly 
more likely to agree that the government should 
censor this content as compared to light Inter-
net users (39%) and non-users (43%). 
FIGURE 6: PREFERENCES FOR GENERAL TYPES OF INTER-
NET CONTENT RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD CENSOR 
(percentage of total respondents,  multiple reponses)
FIGURE 7: PREFERENCES FOR SPECIFC TYPES OF INTERNET 
CONTENT  RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD CENSOR (percent-
age of total respondents,  single reponse)
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Survey respondents were asked to rank their top 
three institutions or organizations they trusted the 
most to regulate the Internet, though 6% of respon-
dents refused to rank any organization and institution 
and replied that no one should regulate the Internet. 
Sources which garnered at least 10% of responses are 
featured in Figure 8 with the percentage that selected 
each institution or organization as their most trusted, 
second most trusted, and third most trusted regulator 
of the Internet presented. The Russian government 
and the Russian security service were virtually tied as 
the overall trusted regulator of the Internet (42% and 
41% respectively), though more Russians ranked the 
Russian security service (17%) as their most trusted 
regulator of the Internet as compared 
to the Russian government (13%).  
Researchers (32%) and the President 
of Russia (30%) were roughly tied for 
the second most trusted regulators of 
the Internet, though more Russians 
cited the presidency (15%) as their first 
choice as compared to researchers 
(12%). The Russian Duma (28%) and 
private industry (26%) were the third 
most overall trusted set of regulators 
cited by Russians, followed by 21% 
citing NGOs and other civil society 
groups and 10% international organi-
zations without Russian officials (e.g. 
UN, ICANN). Interestingly, only 2% of 
Russians trust the international organi-
zations that work with Russian officials, 
such as the International Telecommu-
nication Union (ITU), to regulate the 
Internet (not depicted in Figure 8).
Breaking down by frequency of In-
ternet use Russians’ top choices to 
regulate the Internet reveals significant 
differences in preferences (see Figure 
9). For example, non-users of the In-
ternet as compared to heavy Internet 
users are substantially more likely to 
cite government institutions or agen-
cies as their trusted regulators of the 
Internet such as the Russian government (46% vs. 
36%), Russian security service (44% vs. 37%), and 
the Russian presidency (37% vs. 25%) as compared to 
heavy Internet users. In contrast, heavy Internet users, 
as compared to non-users, are substantially more likely 
to trust regulators of the Internet without official ties to 
the Russian government such as private industry (32% 
vs. 18%), NGOs and other civil society groups (27% 
vs. 14%), and international organizations without ties 
to Russian officials (12% to 5%). 
Beyond whom they may trust to regulate the Inter-
net, survey respondents were also asked several 
questions about their beliefs and preferences about 
Russian Attitudes About Internet Regulation 
& Legislation
FIGURE 8: MOST TRUSTED INSTITUTIONS & ORGANIZATIONS FOR 
REGULATING THE INTERNET (percentage of total respondents,  multiple 
reponses)
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regulatory legislation and policy in Rus-
sia. For instance, Russians were asked 
what they believed were the government’s 
primary motivations when they adopted a 
law creating an official global “blacklist” of 
international websites and Internet content 
that is censored in Russia. Figure 10 de-
picts responses by frequency of Internet 
use segment. 
Overall, 51% of Russians believe the pri-
mary motivation of the government in 
legislating a blacklist of websites is the 
maintenance of political stability as op-
posed to 13% of Russians who believe the 
primary motivation was limiting democratic 
freedoms. A little over one-third of Russians 
(35%) had never heard or was unaware of 
the blacklist law. These percentages var-
ied significantly by frequency of Internet 
use (see Figure 10 above). Heavy Inter-
net users were more than twice as likely 
as non-users (18% vs. 8%) to believe the 
primary motivation was to limit democratic 
freedoms. In addition, almost half (49%) 
of non-users had never heard of the law 
as compared to about one-third (34%) of 
light users and about one-quarter (23%) of 
heavy users. 
The question of whether public opinion 
should be taken into account by public 
bodies when regulating the Internet was 
also posed to survey respondents. A ma-
jority of Russians (56%) believe the state is 
obliged to consider the public’s opinion and 
see public advice on Internet regulation. 
About one-third of Russians (36%) believe 
the state can consider public opinion if it so 
wishes but in the end may act according 
to its own preferences and 9% of Russians 
believe the state should not pay any atten-
tion to public opinion when regulating the 
Internet. 
However, as Figure 11 above illustrates, 
these beliefs also vary by frequency of In-
ternet use. Heavy (62%) and light (58%) 
Internet users are substantially more likely 
to believe the state is obliged to consider 
public opinion and seek public advice 
FIGURE 9: TRUSTED INSTITUTIONS & ORGANIZATIONS FOR REGU-
LATING THE INTERNET BY INTERNET USE SEGMENT  (percentage of 
total respondents,  multiple reponses)
FIGURE 10: GOVERNMENT MOTIVATION FOR BLACKLIST  LEGISLATION 
BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total 
 respondents,  single reponse)
Page 23
FEBRUARY 2015                                                             BENCHMARKING PUBLIC DEMAND: RUSSIA’S APPETITE FOR INTERNET CONTROL
when regulating the Internet than non-users 
(47%). In contrast, significantly more non-
users (43%) than light (34%) and heavy 
(30%) Internet users believe the state may 
consider public opinion if it so wishes but 
may still act as it so chooses. 
Russians were also asked via the survey 
whether personal blogs should be regulated 
more, the same, less than mass media web-
sites, or not at all (see Figure 12). Overall, 
a very large percentage of survey respon-
dents had difficulty answering the question, 
with nearly one out of five (19%) replying that 
it was too difficult to tell. Out the remaining 
response options, the plurality of Russians 
(39%) believe personal blogs should be reg-
ulated the same as mass media websites. 
Otherwise, opinions are about equally split, 
with 15% of Russians believing personal 
blogs should be regulated less than mass 
media websites, 13% believe they should 
be regulated more, and 14% believe they 
should not be regulated at all. 
FIGURE 11: REGULATORY ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION BY  FREQUENCY 
OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents,  
single reponse)
FIGURE 12: BELIEFS ABOUT REGULATION OF PERSONAL BLOGS BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE 
 SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents,  single reponse)
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Russian Internet users (62% of survey respondents) 
were asked a series of questions about citizen mobi-
lization and protest in furtherance of Internet freedom. 
Whether Internet users considered themselves person-
ally impacted by Internet regulation was assessed by 
asking survey respondents if they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement “the regulation of the Internet affects 
my personal freedom.” A majority of Russian Internet 
users (59%) disagreed with the statement and felt that 
they are not personally impacted by Internet regulation 
while 41% believe that they are impacted by regulation. 
If there was a possibility of a mass protest or demon-
stration against government measures to restrict or 
censor the Internet in their local community was also 
asked of Russian Internet users. A follow-up question 
then asked if respondents would personally take part in 
such mobilization if it occurred.
The results depicted in Figure 13 show that 14% of all 
Russian Internet users believe protests against Inter-
net censorship in their community are possible with no 
significant differences between light (12%) and heavy 
(15%) Internet users. In addition, about one in ten (9%) 
Internet users reply they would take part in such pro-
tests if they occurred, with heavy Internet users (11%) 
almost three times as likely to protest than light users 
(4%). 
The survey also asked Russian Internet users to select 
up to three types of Russian government censorship of 
or restrictions on the Internet that may motivate to them 
to engage in mass citizen mobilization and protest in 
defense of Internet freedom. Figure 14 lists their most 
popular selections that garnered at least 7% of men-
tions. Russian Internet users (40%) overwhelmingly 
cited a complete ban on the use of the Internet such 
as exists within the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (i.e. North Korea) as a reason to mobilize and 
protest. Unfortunately, at the same time, about one-
quarter (27%) of all Russian Internet users could not 
cite any type of Internet censorship or restrictions that 
would lead them to protest or mobilize in defense of 
Internet freedom. 
All the other reasons for protest were selected by about 
11% or less of Internet users. For instance, 11% of In-
ternet users selected a complete ban on the Internet in 
the workplace and 9% cited the prohibition of the use 
of the Internet without personal identification as rea-
sons for protest. Four types of Internet restrictions were 
all mentioned by 7% of Internet users: a) the govern-
ment being allowed to remove any type of content from 
the Internet, b) the banning of personal blogs or social 
media sites of opinion, cultural, or opposition, c) the 
prohibition of nicknames and mandatory registration in 
online social networks, and d) temporarily shutting off 
the Internet in the event of a protest. 
Russian Internet users were also asked if they 
had heard about a new legal requirement that new 
websites should be registered with the Russian gov-
ernment agency that manages online communications 
(called the Federal Service for Supervision of Com-
munications, Information Technology and Mass Media, 
“Roskomnadzor” in Russian). Overall, 18% of Rus-
sian Internet users replied that they had heard of the 
requirement, though heavy Internet users (21%) were 
almost twice as likely as light Internet users (13%) to be 
aware of it. 
Out of these Internet users who 
had heard of the law, a rather 
large majority (70%) supported 
the law, a small minority (20%) 
opposed it, and 10% of Internet 
Russians did not know either 
way (see Figure 15). Nearly 
two out of five (37%) of Internet 
users who had heard of the law 
and opposed it (representing 
7% of all Internet users) said 
they were either prepared to 
Russian Citizen Mobilization and Protest
FIGURE 13: BELIEFS ABOUT INTERNET PROTESTS BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET 
USE  SEGMENTS (percentage of Internet users, single reponse) 
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FIGURE 14: TOP REASONS FOR MASS CITIZEN  MOBILIZATION IN DEFENSE OF INTERNET FREEDOM (percentage of 
Internet users, multiple reponses)
FIGURE 15: SUPPORT FOR REQUIRED FEDERAL REGISTRATION FOR ALL RUSSIAN  WEBSITES (percentage of Inter-
net users aware of law, single  reponse)
sign an Internet petition against the requirement (26%) 
or participate in offline protests or rallies (11%).  
Russian Internet users were also asked under what 
circumstance they would or would not support the Rus-
sian government temporarily shutting down the entire 
Internet within Russia.  Figure 16 provides the distribu-
tion of responses.  Overall, 58% of Internet users would 
be in support of such a shutdown, with the case of a 
national emergency garnering the most support (48%) 
followed by 9% of Internet users believing a temporary 
shutdown would be justified in the case of a mass pro-
test and 1% citing some other reason.  In contrast, 42% 
of Internet users believe the shutdown of the Internet 
by the Russian government is never justified no matter 
the situation.
FIGURE 16: SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TEMPORARILY SHUTTING THE INTERNET (percentage of Internet 
users, single reponse)
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The survey population were adults living in the Russian Federation (men and women, 18 years or older). The survey 
was administered face to face by the VCIOM Russian Public Opinion Research Center located in Moscow, Russia 
(www.wciom.com). The survey employed a multi-stage stratified territorial random sample that included 80 regions of 
Russia. Quota sampling within each region at the household level, based on population data from the 2010 Russian 
census, was employed to ensure the representativeness of the survey sample based on gender, age, level of edu-
cation, type of settlement, and employment. The response rate for the survey was 57%. The margin of error (MOE) 
does not exceed +/-3.4% at a 99% confidence level for reported results for the entire population, +/- 3.1% MOE at a 
95% confidence level for reported results for Internet users, and +/- 4.0% MOE at a 95% confidence level for reported 
results of non-users of the Internet. 
Methodological Notes
